Since the concept of ubiquitous computing is firstly proposed by Mark Weiser, its connotation has been extending and expanding by many scholars. In pervasive computing application environment, many kinds of small devices containing smart cart are used to communicate with others. In 2013, Yang et al. proposed an enhanced authentication scheme using smart card for digital rights management. They demonstrated that their scheme is secure enough. However, Mishra et al. pointed out that Yang et al. 's scheme suffers from the password guessing attack and the denial of service attack. Moreover, they also demonstrated that Yang et al. 's scheme is not efficient enough when the user inputs an incorrect password. In this paper, we analyze Yang et al. 's scheme again, and find that their scheme is vulnerable to the session key attack. And, there are some mistakes in their scheme. To surmount the weakness of Yang et al. 's scheme, we propose a more efficient and provable secure digital rights management authentication scheme using smart card based on elliptic curve cryptography.
Introduction
In 1991, ubiquitous computing was firstly proposed by Mark Weiser, who thought that ubiquitous computing technology could provide users service with a variety of equipment in environment which would be disappeared from the user's consciousness [1] . Later, IBM Corporation scientists also raised the idea in 1999, and they forecasted that pervasive computing can be a way to compute everywhere, anytime, and anywhere [2, 3] . Since the computer and internet technology development, multimedia contents (image, document, music, movie, video, etc.) have been greatly enriched all the time, and all of them can be easily redistributed, copied, and downloaded on the internet without authorization. This drawback results in rampant piracy and causes huge revenue to lose to the electronic commerce [4] . As a result, in pervasive computing application environment, the protection of digital publication copyright becomes more and more important. Digital rights management (DRM) technology is developed to overcome the problem [5] . Normally, DRM is only software which usually restricts the usage of the content to protect copy and distributed contents [6] [7] [8] [9] . The DRM system manages the procedure of the digital contents including protection, distribution, and authorization. Using DRM technology, intellectual property is respected and protected by data encryption, so it can only be accessed by authorised users without limitless distribution [10, 11] .
In 2009, the first three-role based DRM implementation scenario authentication scheme using smart card was proposed by Zhang et al. [12] . Then, Yang et al. showed that Zhang et al. 's scheme was vulnerable to the insider attack and the stolen smart card attack [10] . Due to surmounting the weaknesses of Zhang et al. ' ' s scheme and found that their scheme cannot resist the password guessing attack and the denial of service attack. Moreover, they also pointed out that Yang et al. 's scheme is not efficient enough when the user inputs an incorrect password, and this drawback may cause a denial of service attack [13] . Except for the attacks mentioned by Mishra et al., we find out that Yang et al. 's scheme does not resist the session key attack. In addition to this, we also discover that there are some mistakes in their scheme.
We proposed a new efficient and provable secure digital rights management authentication scheme using smart card based on elliptic curve cryptography [14] [15] [16] . To demonstrate the scheme is provable secure, we introduce a security model AFP05 [17, 18] and analyze our scheme in this model. In the following, we will give the proof that our proposed scheme is secure in the AFP05 model. As known to all, one-way hash function is more efficient than the operation of scalar multiplication and pairings [19] [20] [21] . Moreover, the pairing operation costs much more than the scalar multiplication operation. The effort of evaluating one pairing operation is approximately three times the effort of evaluating one scalar multiplication operation. So, we cut down some pairings operation of point on elliptic curve and use hash function instead to increase the scheme's efficiency.
The structure of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notations and definitions used in this paper. Section 3 reviews Yang et al. 's scheme, and Section 4 discusses its weakness analysis. We show the scheme details we propose in Section 5. Section 6 shows a formal security proof of the scheme, while Section 7 demonstrates the security analysis of our proposed scheme. In Section 8, we compare our proposed scheme with Yang et al. 's and Zhang et al. 's scheme. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Notations and Definitions
Let 1 be an additive group with an elliptic curve by the generator and 2 a multiplicative cyclic group by the generator . And both of them have the prime order . Let denote a computable bilinear map : 1 × 1 → 2 satisfying the following three properties [10, 12] : (i) Computability. Given , ∈ 1 , there is an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ).
(ii) Bilinear. ( , ) = ( , ) , where , ∈ 1 and , ∈ * .
(iii) Nondegenerate. Let be the generator of 1 , ( , ) ̸ = 1
2

.
Several commonly used notations and their descriptions are described after the Conclusions Section to facilitate the following references.
Review of Yang et al.'s Scheme
There are three phases in their scheme; they are, respectively, registration phase, mutual authentication and key agreement phase, and password update phase.
Registration Phase
3.1.1. User's Registration Section. In this part, a user requests to be a legal user and the server conducts the next operations.
U1
( → : {ID , PW }). The user generates his/her own identity ID and password PW freely. Then, chooses a nonce randomly and computes
After that, sends {ID , PW } to the server securely.
After obtaining the message sent by , the server begins to compute
Then, stores { } in the verification table. Afterward, the server issues a smart card containing { , 2 (⋅)} and transmits it to through a secure channel.
U3.
The is input into the smart card by the , which contains { , , 2 (⋅)}, finally.
Device's Registration Section.
In this section, the device requests to be authorized by the , and the following steps should be performed together with the server.
D1 ( → : {ID }).
The device transmits its identity {ID } to the server through a secure channel.
D2 ( → : { }).
After obtaining the message sent by , the begins to compute
And it is sent to via a secure channel. Afterward, the device's public key and secret key are = 1 (ID ) and .
Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
After the inserts his/her smart card into a smart card reader and inputs his/her identity ID and password PW , the smart card randomly chooses a secret number and a nonce . And it computes PW = 2 (PW ⊕ ) ,
Next transmits the message = { ( ), 1 , 2 } to .
M2 (
→ : {ID , ID , , , }). Upon obtaining the message sent by , the chooses a number randomly and computes = ,
Then, transmits the message {ID , ID , , , } to .
When the server receives the message, it computes = 2 ( 1 (ID )) ,
and checks whether 2 is equal to 2 ( ⊕PW ⊕PW ).
If this holds, the will authenticate and update with = PW ⊕ . Otherwise, this authentication request is rejected. Then, computes
and checks whether ( , ) = ( , + ) .
If this holds, the device is authenticated by . Otherwise, this authentication request is rejected. After that, the server generates two random strings 1 , 3 , and a random number
At last, the replies with the message {ID , ID , ID , 1 ,
The correctness of (8) is shown as follows:
After receiving the message from , computes
and checks whether
If this holds, the server is authenticated by the device . Otherwise, this authentication procedure fails. Then, generates a random string 1 and computes
.
Finally, sends the message {ID , ID , 1 , 2 , 6 ,
3
( 1 )} to the user . The correctness of (12) is shown as follows:
and checks whether 
Finally, generates the session key shared with by computing
) and sends the message {
( 1 )} back to the device .
M6.
After obtaining the message sent by , the device computes
The is the session key between and device . 
Then, transmits
Once obtaining the message sent by , the computes In addition to this, we also discover that there are some mistakes in their scheme. We will introduce our new discoveries in the following.
Session Key Attack.
If an attacker intercepted the message {ID , ID , ID , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 } which was sent from the server to the device and modified some data in it, the user and the device may establish different session key. So the attacker can realize the session key attack as the following steps.
(1) The attacker can intercept and capture the message {ID , ID , ID , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 } sent to device by the server. Next, generates a number 0 randomly and computes
} is sent to the device by the attacker . (2) After receiving the message, computes
and checks the equation
Obviously, they are equal. Then, generates a random string 1 and computes
) , ( 1 )} to the user . In this step, the string 3 0 is not equal to the random string 3 generated by the server.
The correctness of (22) is shown as follows:
(3) Because did not modify the message {ID , ID , 1 ,
and . After that, generates a random string 1 and computes
Finally, generates the session key
) shared with the device and sends the message {
3
( 1 )} back to the device . In this step, the string 3 is equal to the random string 3 generated by the server and not equal to the string 3 0 computed by the device.
(4) Once obtaining the message sent by the user, the device computes
is the session key shared between the user and the device . Obviously, the session key computed by the user is different from the session key 0 computed by the device. So Yang et al. 's scheme suffers from the session key attack.
Some Mistakes.
In mutual authentication and key agreement phase, the identity ID has not been sent to the device . But, when the device computes = 3 (ID ‖ID ‖ ‖ ), it already knows the user's identity. According to the common sense, if the user has not sent identity to the device, the device cannot obtain the user's identity. So there is a mistake in this phase. What is more, this mistake also exists in the password update phase of Yang et al. 's scheme.
Our Proposed Scheme
Based on Yang et al. 's scheme, our protocol also contains four phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the key agreement phase, and the password update phase. Algorithm 1 describes our scheme's registration phase. The login phase and the key agreement phase will be shown in Algorithm 2. At last, we show the password update phase in Algorithm 3. The detail is shown as the following.
Registration Phase.
In our proposed scheme, the registration phase also can be divided into two parts: the user's registration phase and the device's registration phase. Our device's registration phase is the same as the device's registration phase in Yang et al. 's scheme. We will describe our user's registration phase as follows.
R1 (
→ : {ID , PW , ID }). An identity ID and password PW are chosen by user freely. Then, generates a nonce randomly and computes
After that, sends {ID , PW , ID } to the server via a secure channel.
After obtaining the message sent by , computes
Then, the server issues a smart card containing { , , , , 2 (⋅), (⋅)/ (⋅)} and passes it to securely.
R3
. enters into the smart card, so it contains { , , , , , 2 (⋅), (⋅)/ (⋅)}.
Login Phase.
inserts his/her smart card into a smart card reader and inputs his/her identity ID and password PW . Then the smart card begins to compute
and checks whether is equal to 2 ( ⊕ ). If this holds, it will authenticate the identity and password of the user. Otherwise, this user's request procedure is rejected.
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
User's Registration Phase:
Choose ID and PW Generate a random nonce Compute PW
Algorithm 1: The registration phase.
Key Agreement
Phase. There are six steps and five messages during each run of the proposed protocol. The details are as follows.
Then, the smart card generates a secret string 1 randomly and computes
Next transmits the message
Upon obtaining the message sent by , the generates a number 1 randomly and computes
Then, transmits the message
} to the server .
When the server received the message, it computes
and checks whether ( , ) is equal to ( , + 1 ⋅ ). If this holds, the device is authenticated by . Otherwise, this authentication request is rejected. Then, computes
and checks whether 1 is equal to 2 ( ⊕ ⊕ 1 ). If this holds, the user is authenticated by . Otherwise, this authentication request is rejected. After that, the server generates a random string 1 . Then computes
Finally, the replies with the message 2 = { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 } to the device .
After receiving the message, computes
Login Phase:
Generate a random string 1
Generate a random number 2
Algorithm 2: The login phase and the key agreement phase. 
Input ID , PW and PW
Finally, the device transmits the message
The user checks whether 3 is equal to 2 ( 1 ⊕ ⊕ 2 ). If this holds, the user authenticates the . Otherwise, this authentication procedure fails. After that, computes
Then, the user checks whether 2 is equal to 2 ( ‖ ‖ 1 ). If this holds, the device is authenticated by the user . Otherwise, this authentication procedure fails. generates a random number 2 and computes
where is the session key shared between the user and the device . Finally, sends the message 
A6.
After obtaining the message sent by the user, the device checks whether is equal to 2 ( ‖ ‖ 1 ). If this holds, the user is authenticated by the device . Otherwise, this authentication procedure fails. Then, computes
The is the session key between the user and the device . 
Next transmits the message {ID ,
Once obtaining the message sent by the user, the computes
and checks whether 2 is equal to 2 ( ⊕ ) ⊕ 1 ⊕ PW new ). If this holds, will accept the user's request. Otherwise, this request procedure is rejected. Then, the server computes
and sends the message { 1 , 2 } back to the user .
C3.
When the user received the message from the server, he/she computes 
Security Model and Proof
In this part, the provable secure method will be employed to prove that our proposed protocol is provable secure in the models in [18] .
Security Model.
In 2005, Abdalla et al. proposed a security model AFP05, which is suitable for the three-party authenticated key agreement scenario. It contains two types of participants, such as the client and the trusted server [18] . But there are three types of participants in our proposed protocol, a user, a trusted device, and a trusted server. So we add a query SendDevice in our security model. During the execution of the protocol, and have many instances, respectively. and denote the th instance of and the th instance of . There exists one state of accept, reject, and ⊥ in an oracle. If the oracle gets correct message, it turns the accept state; otherwise, it turns reject. ⊥ means that no decision has been reached or no result has been returned. The adversary , which is abstracted as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machine, interacts with other participants through a bounded number of queries which model the capabilities of the adversary in an actual attack. The queries are listed as follows.
SendClient( , ). After receiving message
sent by the adversary, the generates a message and outputs as the result of this query. A query SendClient( , Start) begins a new key agreement process.
SendDevice( , ). After receiving message
sent by the adversary, the generates a message and output.
SendServer( , ). After receiving message
Reveal( / ). If no session key is defined for instance / or if either / or its partner is asked a Test query, the result of this query is the invalid symbol ⊥. Otherwise the session key generated by the instance / is returned.
Test( / ).
If no session key is defined for instance / or if either / or its partner is asked a Reveal query, the result of this query is the invalid symbol ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle flips a coin . If = 1, the session key is output. Otherwise, a value randomly chosen from the distribution space of session key is output.
The queries defined in our improved AFP05 security model can be simulated using the SendClient, SendDevice, and SendServer queries repeatedly if we assume that there is at least one benign adversary which faithfully relays message flows. In our improved AFP05 security model, the notion of freshness is already embedded in the definition of the oracles. A Find-Then-Guess (FTG) model exists in our improved AFP05 security model, in which the semantic security is defined by a game with two phases. In the first phase, the adversary is able to adaptively execute SendClient, SendDevice, SendServer, Reveal, and Test query. In the second, executes a single Test query and guesses a bit for , where is selected in the Test query. If = , the adversary wins the game. Let Succ denote the event that the adversary correctly guesses the bit , and the advantage of that attacks the protocol is defined as
A 3PAKA protocol is considered semantically secure in FTG model if and only if Adv FTG−3PAKA ( , ) = max {Adv FTG−3PAKA ( )} is negligible, where the maximum time executed by all the adversaries with time-complexity at most and the number of queries at most . [10] . Let , be two large prime numbers and | ( − 1). Let be a multiplicative subgroup of * , with prime number order and element 0 generator.
Mathematical Computational Problems
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH).
Given { 0 , 0 , 0 ∈ } and , ∈ * , it is hard to compute mod . The probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machine denoted as Δ, the probability of which could successfully solve CDH problem in , is defined as (i) For a hash query ( , * , ℎ), ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we proceed as follows:
(a) Rule (ii) For a query Reveal ( / ), we proceed as follows:
(a) If no session key is defined for instance / or if either / or its partner is asked a Test query, the output is ⊥. Otherwise the output of this query is which is defined for the instance / .
(iii) For a query Test ( / ), we proceed as follows:
(a) If no session key is defined for instance / or if either / or its partner is asked a Reveal query, the output is ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle flips a bit . If = 1, the session key is output. Otherwise, a value randomly chosen from the distribution space of session key is output.
Game 0 . This is the actual attack game. According to the definition, we have
Otherwise, we randomly generate a bit if the game aborts or stops without answer from or has not finished the game. Rule (2) . If this query is directly issued by the adversary, and ( , * , ℎ) ∈{1,2,3} ∈ , the game abort; Otherwise, ℎ is returned.
Given that hash value ℎ is selected from a random uniform distribution, the probability of collisions is at most (
. Game 2 and game 1 are perfectly indistinguishable unless the abovementioned rule causes the game abort. Hence,
Game 3 . The game 3 is defined by aborting the executions in which the adversary has obtained a valid authenticator without asking the corresponding hash query by guessing , 1 , 4 , 3 ,
2
, or . The following rules are used.
We check the equation ( , ) = ( , + 1 ⋅ ). If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we verify whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ or (3, (ID ‖ID ‖ ‖ 2 1 ),
. If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, accepts and continues.
If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we verify whether (2, ( ⊕ ⊕ 1 ), 1 ) ∈ or {(ID , * , * , 1 ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ . If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; Otherwise, accepts and continues.
SendClient, SendDevice, SendServer Queries.
(i) For a query SendClient( , Start), we proceed as follows: 
, and instance accepts and applies the following rule.
, and
terminates and record {(ID ,
,
(iii) For a query SendDevice( , } is returned. Then, instance proceeds to an expecting state.
(iv) For a query SendDevice( , 2 ), we proceed as follows if instance is in an expecting state:
, and we check whether
. If the equation does not hold, instance terminates without accepting. Otherwise, instance accepts and applies the following rule. PW ) ) and we check whether
If the equation does not hold, instance terminates without accepting. Otherwise, instance accepts and applies the following rule.
(c) Rule
. We check the
terminates without accepting; else we verify whether (2, ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ 1 ‖ 3 ), 4 ) ∈ or {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , 4 ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ . If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, accepts and continues.
Rule 2 (3) . We check the equation
If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we verify whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , 3 , * ), ( * , * , 2 , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ or (2,
If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, accepts and continues.
If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we verify whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , 2 , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ or (2, ( ‖ ‖ 1 ), 2 ) ∈ . If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, accepts and continues.
Rule 4 (3) . We check the equation 2 ( ‖ ‖ 1 ) = . If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we verify whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , )} ∈ or (2, ( ‖ ‖ 1 ), ) ∈ . If the two tests fail, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, instance accepts and continues. Game 3 and Game 2 are almost indistinguishable only if the rules mentioned above cause the instance to reject a valid authenticator. Because the adversary deduces the authenticator without issuing the corresponding hash queries, the probability of guessing is at most ( /2( − 1)) + ( /2 ) + ( V /2 ) + ( /2 ) + ( /2 ) + ( V /2 ). Hence, , or by guessing the corresponding secret messages and querying the corresponding hash function. We use the following rules.
We check the equation ( , ) = ( , + 1 ⋅ ). If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we confirm whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ . If the test fails, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, we check whether (3, (ID ‖ID ‖ ‖ 2 1 ),
. If this is the case, we abort the game.
If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we confirm whether {(ID , * , * , 1 ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈ . If the test fails, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, we check whether
If this is the case, we abort the game.
terminates without accepting; else we confirm whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , * , 4 ), ( * , * , * , * ), ( * , * )} ∈
. If the test fails, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, we check whether (2, ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ 1 ‖ 3 ), 4 ) ∈ . If this is the case, we abort the game.
Rule 2 (4) . We check the equation
If it does not hold, terminates without accepting; else we confirm whether {(ID , * , * , * ), (ID , * , * , * ), ( * , * , 3 , * ), ( * , * , 2 , * ), ( * , * )} ∈
. If the test fails, rejects the authenticator and terminates without accepting; otherwise, we check whether 
Game 6 . In this game, the random self-reducibility of the CDH problem is used to simulate the executions. Given a CDH instance ( , ), where , ∈ 1 , the next rules are listed.
Rule 3 (6) : By the definition of event AskH5, event AskH6 means that the adversary has issued a query to random oracle on ( ‖ ‖CDH( , ) ). The number of records, such as (2, * , * ) in the list , is 2 , and the probability of obtaining the CDH( , ) value from list is 1/ 2 . Hence, the accumulated probability is 
Finally, we summarize all the relationships and complete the proof.
From (50) 
From (49) and (58), we obtain (48) and the Theorem 1.
Security Analysis of Our Scheme
To get over the problems existing in Yang et al. 's scheme, we proposed a provable secure and efficient authentication scheme using smart card based on elliptic curve cryptography. In this part, we will show that the scheme we proposed is secure against various attacks [23, 24] . Table 1 . It is known to all that one-way hash function is more efficient than the operation of scalar multiplication. Moreover, the pairing operation costs much more than the scalar multiplication operation. The effort of evaluating one pairing operation is approximately three times the effort of evaluating one scalar multiplication operation. Therefore our proposed scheme performs better than Zhang et al. 's scheme and Yang et al. 's scheme. Consequently, our proposed scheme is much more suitable for practical applications.
Conclusions
We have analyzed the scheme of Yang et al. and pointed out, except the attacks mentioned in Mishra et al. paper, their scheme suffers from the session key attack and has some mistakes. We propose a new provable secure and efficient digital rights management authentication scheme using smart card based on elliptic curve cryptography to surmount the problems in Yang et al. ' s. And we demonstrate that the new scheme is provable secure under the model AFP05 introduced in this paper. Because hash function is used to replace the operations of point on elliptic curve and the symmetric key computation in our scheme, our scheme is more efficient than Yang et al. 's scheme. As a result, our proposed scheme is more suitable for practical applications in ubiquitous computing.
Notations
:
Th eu s e r :
Th es e r v e r :
Th ed e v i c e :
The attacker ID :
Th eu s e r 's identity :
Th es e c r e tk e yo ft h es e r v e r : Th ep u b l i ck e yo ft h es e r v e r and = PW :
Th eu s e r 's password : Th ep u b l i ck e yo ft h eu s e r and = 1 (ID )
